摘要 :
This monograph explores the origins of the principle of mass and its components: numerical strength, combat power and the decisive point. It concludes that the Napoleonic legacy of the principle of mass has not kept pace with mode...
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This monograph explores the origins of the principle of mass and its components: numerical strength, combat power and the decisive point. It concludes that the Napoleonic legacy of the principle of mass has not kept pace with modern battlefield dispersion and the evolutionary diffusion of the decisive point. Therefore, leaders must consider the nature of battlefield dispersion in order to understand the utility of the principle of mass under modern conditions. Jomini defined the principle of mass as bringing superior numbers upon the decisive point. FM 100-5 substitutes combat power for numbers, acknowledging the impact of weapons technology on the nature of war. However, the definition of decisive point remains largely unchanged from that of Jomini--generally either a geographic or force-oriented point. While geographic decisive points remain somewhat the same, the force-oriented decisive point has undergone considerable change from the time of Jomini.
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This paper examines the recent assignment of U.S. Air Force civil engineers to joint missions, across the range of military operations, in order to forecast the feasibility and suitability of continuing this practice in the future...
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This paper examines the recent assignment of U.S. Air Force civil engineers to joint missions, across the range of military operations, in order to forecast the feasibility and suitability of continuing this practice in the future. Air Force engineers have been extremely effective in joint combat support roles, since their substantial joint combat use beginning in 2004. Based on this success, their demand has grown and will likely grow beyond the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Air Force leaders have raised valid concerns with forces organized, trained, and equipped to support combat air power being overused for combat service support of the land component. Joint employment of Air Force engineers to an extent or in a manner that undermines their ability to support bed down and sustainment of air power assets would be problematic. In addition, issues spanning apportionment in global force management processes, roles and missions for Air Force engineers in the joint environment, and command relationships between service engineer units in joint operations should be further studied and where appropriate incorporated in joint engineer doctrine.
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Small nations should not be asking themselves whether they need air combat forces or not they do, Combat aircraft are a nation's most visible, flexible, and lethal force option that can be employed, or threatened to be employed, i...
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Small nations should not be asking themselves whether they need air combat forces or not they do, Combat aircraft are a nation's most visible, flexible, and lethal force option that can be employed, or threatened to be employed, in a range of missions. However small Western democratic national air forces suffer from lack of platforms, budgetary pressures, economics, credibility, and a visible threat. They are unable to mount a credible unilateral response, and with limited budgets they cannot pursue air force structures of multiple aircraft types and attempts to remain balanced, i,e, capable of performing a range of functions associated with the effective employment of combat air power. Broadly speaking small nations have two choices: firstly structure for combined operations (be it alliance/coalition), or secondly equip for unilateral action if the perceived threat and/or unlikely hood of outside assistance dictates. For combined operations it makes sense to consolidate the combat aircraft into a single fighter-bomber type, with the intention of operating in a probable American led coalition-(the United States US would secure, protect, and run the area of operations AO). This aircraft does not need to be highly sophisticated but it must be equipped to be able to function in a coalition capable of precision engagement, self protection, and communicating with its coalition partners.
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The United States Air Force is increasingly facing more diverse threat situations while existing force structure levels are being reduced and proposed compositions are being severely scrutinized for relevance, affordability, and e...
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The United States Air Force is increasingly facing more diverse threat situations while existing force structure levels are being reduced and proposed compositions are being severely scrutinized for relevance, affordability, and effectiveness. Military planners are struggling with the question of how to generate a single force structure that can adequately respond to a multitude of threat scenarios in an uncertain future while at the same time being tasked to prove just how effective their choice will be. In the past, modeling has been effective in showing how a force can respond to a single threat scenario but a new modeling technique needs to be developed for constructing a robust force capable of success across a gambit of scenarios. This thesis proposes a meta-heuristic approach to solving the planner's multi- scenario optimization problem. The approach makes use of an existing single scenario optimizer, the Combat Forces Assessment Model (CFAM), a public domain genetic algorithm, GENESIS, and a Visual Basic controller module to link them together. The approach is demonstrated by finding a robust AEF strike force tasked against three notional AEF threat scenarios.
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Civilians have participated in supporting soldiers on the battlefield in everyAmerican War or conflict since the founding of the nation. They performed a variety of functions, (e.g. supply, transportation, maintenance, communicati...
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Civilians have participated in supporting soldiers on the battlefield in everyAmerican War or conflict since the founding of the nation. They performed a variety of functions, (e.g. supply, transportation, maintenance, communications and medical). Typically, they were behind the lines and volunteered for this duty. With the drawdown of the Military, and the attendant civilianization of military positions, jobs critical to the combat mission were filled by civilians. Desert Shield/Desert Storm, was the first conflict in which the decision to civilianize critical combat positions was into question. Could the Army order Civilians into battle. Are they combatants. What are the procedures to get them into battle. What are their entitlements while serving in an area of hostilities. Fortunately, there were more civilians who volunteered for this duty than were needed. But, what about future conflicts. This paper addresses these questions and the changes necessary to insure that civilians are as well trained for their roles in battle as the soldier.
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Since it was founded in April 1987, the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has provided the Nation with special operations forces (SOF) that are arguably the most capable in the world. SOCOM trains, equips, and provides joint...
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Since it was founded in April 1987, the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has provided the Nation with special operations forces (SOF) that are arguably the most capable in the world. SOCOM trains, equips, and provides joint special operations capabilities to each regional CINC, American ambassadors and country teams, and governmental agencies. SOCOM ensures the combat readiness of forces assigned and monitors the preparedness of SOF assigned to other commands. Unique among the unified commands, SOCOM manages its own program and budget and also conducts research, development, and acquisition (RD&A) of SOF-peculiar items. Lastly, the command maintains a proficient Reserve component which is fully integrated into the total SOF concept.
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Today, the U.S. Army is decisively engaged in both fighting an unfamiliar type of war and transforming itself to meet the challenges of future warfare. But what are those challenges. What capabilities does U.S. strategy demand of ...
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Today, the U.S. Army is decisively engaged in both fighting an unfamiliar type of war and transforming itself to meet the challenges of future warfare. But what are those challenges. What capabilities does U.S. strategy demand of its military instrument. Where are the major capability gaps, and how should they inform Army Transformation to ensure the future expeditionary Army has the right campaign qualities. This paper argues that the major capability gap in today's force - and vital for future campaigns - is the ability to conduct stabilization. It begins with exploring the changes in U.S. strategy that are the impetus behind the need for greater capacity to conduct post conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Then, it analyzes the emerging role of the Army in post-conflict operations in the context of modern combat to more fully understand the specific requirements of stabilization. The paper then develops an operational concept - progressive stabilization - that complements the Army's concept of rapid decisive operations while improving its ability to contribute to long-term conflict resolution. It outlines three key force attributes an expeditionary force structure must have to provide the requisite mix of combat and stabilization capabilities. Finally, this paper builds on those attributes to suggest three areas where Army leaders must make near-term adjustments in the Modular Force to ensure the nation has a truly expeditionary force with the campaign capacity for both rapid decisive operations and stabilization.
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摘要 :
The interrelationship of strategy and logistics is discussed leading to a review of the development of logistics doctrine and principals of combat support. The Air Force's present doctrine on combat support and a logistics concept...
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The interrelationship of strategy and logistics is discussed leading to a review of the development of logistics doctrine and principals of combat support. The Air Force's present doctrine on combat support and a logistics concept of operations developed to support it is described. Emphasis is on how combat support doctrine and the concept of operations affect the tactical air forces and their ability to project combat power. Present combat support doctrine and its resulting concept of operations is, guiding the tactical air forces correctly. However, several areas of concern are identified and suggestions provided. (sdw)
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